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ENCOURAGING SUSTAINABLE INNOVATION: IS THERE
ROOM FOR A POST-GRANT ENVIRONMENTAL
CHALLENGE IN AMERICAN PATENT LAW?
SAMUEL HABEIN*

INTRODUCTION
In a 2019 NPR interview, Bill McKibben, author of Falter: Has the
Human Game Begun to Play Itself Out?, argued that a great “architecture
of deceit[,] denial and disinformation [has] kept us locked for 30 years in a
sterile debate about whether or not global warming [is] real.”1 McKibben
goes on to insist that the great, misinforming debate has been the linchpin
preventing a swift response to the “greatest challenge humans have ever
faced”—man-made climate change.2
Private industry and actors within the government have been
allowed to ignore and exacerbate climate change due to a lack of consensus amongst the American populous. With a meager fifty-nine percent of
Americans believing that climate change is a major threat to humanity,3
companies fear that making financial and logistical sacrifices to decrease
the environmental impact of their products will make them less competitive.4 But, the universality of climate change requires participation from

*

JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2022. I would like to just list the people
that have gotten me where I am and will be with me wherever I go: Peter and Theresa
Habein, Gerald and Joanne Morgan, Harold and Jeanne Habein, Claire Habein, Abby
Finlay, Laura Habein, Emerson Luke, Ryan Lynch, Tom Merchant, Calvin Borges, Olivia
Swant-Johnson, Joe Donovan, Edward DeLuca, Alex Young, William Byrne, Derrick
Jones, Jason Grand, and finally Fiona Carroll, Thatcher & Holly.
1
Fresh Air, Climate Change Is ‘Greatest Challenge Humans Have Ever Faced,’ Author
Says, NPR (Apr. 16, 2019, 1:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/16/713829853/climate
-change-is-greatest-challenge-humans-have-ever-faced-author-says [https://perma.cc
/MN9M-6ALY].
2
Id.
3
Moira Fagan & Christine Huang, A Look at How People Around the World View Climate
Change, PEW RSCH.CTR. (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/18
/a-look-at-how-people-around-the-world-view-climate-change/ [https://perma.cc/53SM-MDYZ].
4
Ram Nidumolu et al., Why Sustainability Is Now the Key Driver of Innovation, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Sept. 2009), https://hbr.org/2009/09/why-sustainability-is-now-the-key-driver
-of-innovation#:~:text=Our%20research%20shows%20that%20sustainability,reduc
ing%20the%20inputs%20they%20use. [https://perma.cc/MQ6C-NXJS].
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all populations, industries, and sovereigns. Economists argue that the
maintenance of a healthy global economy requires true integration of economic, social, and environmental well-being.5
This Note examines potential changes within the American patenting system that might renew the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s
(“USPTO”) dedication to the promotion of progress through a post-grant
environmental challenge to patents. There are many ways to encourage
“green” innovation by challenging practices that harm the environment,
but the patent system has a unique ability to discourage environmentally
harmful innovation by refusing to grant exclusionary rights—rights that
many industries require to thrive.6 However, a post-grant environmental
challenge would undoubtedly disrupt the American patent system in
severe ways that this Note does not address. Therefore, this Note is not
arguing that such a challenge should be implemented, but serves the purpose of starting a discussion. Where can we find the tools to combat climate
change? Here, this Note discusses how the existing incentives within the
patent system could be manipulated to encourage sustainable innovation
within industry.
First, Part I outlines the importance of green innovation in the
battle against climate change. Part I continues to address the impact that
the patent system has on fostering green innovation and discusses where
dirty innovation remains prevalent. Part II takes a closer look at how
patent laws influence industry. In particular, the shape of India’s pharmaceutical industry demonstrates the power that patent law has on the
path industry takes within a nation. Part III demonstrates how the
structure and key attributes of the inter partes review (“IPR”) and postgrant review (“PGR”) can act as a blueprint for the creation of a workable
post-grant environmental challenge process that is both cost effective
and timely. Part IV demonstrates Congress’s power to create an environmental challenge while maintaining its international obligations and
staying within the bounds of the Constitution. Lastly, Part V concludes
by addressing some critics of the seldomly discussed idea of an environmental challenge.
5

Richard A. Clarke et al., The Challenge of Going Green, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jul.–Aug.
1994), https://hbr.org/1994/07/the-challenge-of-going-green [https://perma.cc/UM9P-9ZPG].
6
The patent system has historically directed the nature of industry. An illustrative example of patent law’s ability to shift the foundations of industry is India’s pharmaceutical
industry following changes to Intellectual Property (“IP”) protection. See generally Janice
Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent System
and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (2007).
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GREEN INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Climate change began with innovation in the industrial world, so
it is fitting that industrial innovation is crucial to a lasting solution.7 The
predominant measure for calculating global warming contribution is the
emission of greenhouse gasses, of which industry creates a significant
market share.8 Industry represents the processes that produce the goods
and raw materials that Americans consume and export and can account
for roughly twenty-three percent of greenhouse gas emissions in the
United States.9 Calculated through a combination of direct and indirect
emissions from electricity, industrial greenhouse gas emissions have
generally decreased since the late nineties.10 The marginal reduction in
industrial pollution during this time can be attributed to a number of
efforts: there has been a general movement towards clean energy; the use
of recycled materials has proven to be both economical and sustainable;
and some companies have made efforts to reduce their footprint for
ethical or public relations capital.11 While much of the progress towards
net zero carbon emissions can be traced to grassroot movements, one of
the most important forces reducing industrial emissions has been the
EPA’s promulgation of technology standards that spurred green innovation as a necessity to the growth of American industry.12
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) contains both voluntary and forced technology provisions.13 Section 103(g) of the CAA created one of the many
7

The beginning of human’s harmful impact on the climate can be traced to the industrial
revolution and the explosion of these effects occurred during the innovative and economic
boom following the Second World War. See Roz Pidcock, Scientists Clarify Starting Point
for Human-Caused Climate Change, CARBON BRIEF (Aug. 24, 2016, 6:00 PM), https://
www.carbonbrief.org/scientists-clarify-starting-point-for-human-caused-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/F225-MXYW].
8
See Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-green
house-gas-emissions#:~:text=Industry%20(22.0%20percent%20of%202018,pro
duce%20goods%20from%20raw%20materials [https://perma.cc/KD7T-XBDJ] (last updated
July 27, 2021).
9
Id.
10
There was a slight increase while recovering from a significant drop in industrial
pollution during the 2008 recession, and a general increase in industrial pollution under
the Trump administration. Id.
11
Id.
12
Judy Foster & Rob Brenner, Clean Air and Technology Innovation: Working Concepts
for Promoting Clean Technology Innovation Under the Clean Air Act, NICHOLAS INST. ENV’T
POL’Y SOLUTIONS, at ii–iv (June 2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default
/files/publications/ni_r_13-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE68-PML9].
13
See, e.g., Progress Cleaning the Air: Voluntary Partnership Program Accomplishments,
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/progress-cleaning-air-voluntary-partner
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environmental success stories, the ENERGY STAR program.14 ENERGY
STAR spans various sectors, and each have been successful for different
reasons. For industrial plants, ENERGY STAR encourages sustainability
with resources that demonstrate how best to lower emissions while remaining affordable.15 ENERGY STAR annually certifies industrial plants
performing within the top quarter of their sector.16 In 2018, ENERGY
STAR’s committed plant technology improvements reduced electricity
usage by thirty-six billion kilowatt-hours, cut energy costs by three billion dollars, and reduced their greenhouse gas footprint by forty million
metric tons.17
However, despite both voluntary and forced improvements in the
efficiency and footprint of industrial technology, the American industry
sector still emitted almost 2,000 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent—far
too much.18 Brad Plumer, a climate reporter specializing in policy and
technology efforts to cut carbon emissions wrote: “[t]o stop global warming, we’ll need to zero out greenhouse gas emissions from billions of different sources worldwide: every coal plant in China, every steel mill in
Europe, every car and truck on American highways.”19 These are lofty,
many have argued impossible, benchmarks to achieve.20 However, with the
longevity of our planet and all of its inhabitants suspended in the balance, there is one thing that is certain: we must build on the progress that
we have made.
ship-program-accomplishments [https://perma.cc/2XJA-N2DB] (last updated Aug. 12, 2021)
(demonstrating a number of voluntary programs and their successes).
14
Statutory Authority for ENERGY STAR, EPA, https://www.energystar.gov/about/ori
gins_mission/epas_role_energy_star/epa%E2%80%99s_statutory_authority_energy_star
[https://perma.cc/JNG5-LTCR] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
15
Overview, ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/about/origins_mission/energy
_star_overview/about_energy_star_industrial_plants [https://perma.cc/7TDM-QMT3] (last
visited Mar. 11, 2022).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
See Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, EPA, https://www.epa.gov
/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks [https://perma.cc/K5G6
-7J63] (last updated Oct. 26, 2021).
19
Brad Plumer, How Do We Stop Fossil Fuel Emissions?, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.ny
times.com/interactive/2020/04/19/climate/climate-crash-course-4.html [https://perma.cc
/CF2G-LQGN] (last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
20
John Baez, a mathematician and climate scientist, discusses in detail the extreme
difficulty of reaching net zero carbon emissions. See generally John Baez, Is Net Zero
Emissions an Impossible Goal? What It would Take to Suck More Carbon Dioxide Out of
the Air than We Put In., NAUTILUS (Nov. 27, 2019), https://nautil.us/issue/78/atmospheres
/is-net-zero-emissions-an-impossible-goal [https://perma.cc/62H4-MA2X].
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A post-grant environmental challenge might help to address the
economic imperative to make profits at the expense of our planet. While
cheaper, more profitable products and processes may be seen as innovative in the eyes of the American economy, an environmental challenge to
patents might force industry to reevaluate profitability of dirty innovation and implement practices ensuring that their products do not unduly
prejudice the environment. A post-grant environmental challenge could
take away monetary gains and enhance the value of social and environmental capital for the betterment of the planet.
And the importance of sustainable technology and green innovation
extends beyond industry and into the average American’s house. The
average American creates twenty-three tons of CO2 annually, thirteen tons
more than the average citizen in other industrialized countries.21 Personal carbon output is primarily attributed to the consumption of food, use
of electricity, and transportation.22 Again, incentives through programs
like ENERGY STAR and a general rise in conservation awareness have
led to a reduction in personal emissions in recent years.23
Unfortunately, the Trump administration undid decades of environmental progress.24 Regulatory reforms, like the Safer Affordable FuelEfficiency (“SAFE”) Vehicle Rule, stunt regulations that guide the automotive industry towards sustainability and encourage the industry to
dismantle progress already gained in favor of short-term profitability.25
The SAFE Vehicle Rule allegedly intends to make “newer, safer, and
cleaner vehicles more accessible for American families” while saving jobs
in the automotive industry.26 However, environmental groups, including
21

One Ton of Carbon Emissions: What Does That Look Like?, TERRAPASS (Oct. 24, 2017),
https://www.terrapass.com/blog/one-ton-carbon-emissions-look-like [https://perma.cc
/9X2Z-NDHE].
22
Carbon Footprint Factsheet, UNIV. MICH. CTR. SUSTAINABLE SYS. (2020), https://css
.umich.edu/factsheets/carbon-footprint-factsheet [https://perma.cc/8TAM-Y5HK].
23
See Impacts, ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/about/origins_mission/im
pacts [https://perma.cc/7H3D-Q38Q] (last visited Mar.11, 2022).
24
See Nadia Popovich et al., The Trump Administration Rolled Back More Than 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive
/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html [https://perma.cc/WB62-C9ZQ] (last
updated Jan. 20, 2021). While the Biden administration has rectified many of these
changes, many remain and the president’s ability to drastically impact climate change
regulation through executive order has become clear.
25
See Nathan Rott & Jennifer Ludden, Trump Administration Weakens Auto Emissions
Standards, NPR (Mar. 31, 2020, 12:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/31/824431240
/trump-administration-weakens-auto-emissions-rolling-back-key-climate-policy
[https://perma.cc/SVV7-785U].
26
Id.
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the EPA’s own scientific advisory board, argue that the administration’s
logic is flawed; “weakened standards will lead to dirtier air and cost
consumers at the gas pump long-term.”27
A closer look at the American automotive industry demonstrates
a reluctance to address climate change concerns. American auto makers
have, to the perplexation of the rest of the world,28 focused on profitable
SUVs.29 Not long ago, the Great Recession caused a panic for American
manufacturers who were ultimately bailed out by the federal government—a bailout that came with a mandate for more efficient vehicles.30
And while there has been a steep increase in patent filings in the automotive space, U.S. companies’ share of sustainable automotive patents
continually decreases.31 In particular, the United States’ early lead in the
area of electric propulsion has evaporated.32 Many American electric
carmakers and promising battery innovators were bought by Chinese
interests with significant backing from their government.33 Therefore, it
is possible that the future could bring an automotive industry dominated
by Chinese design and manufacturing.
The majority of American automotive applications linger in the
quickly ageing field of internal combustion engines (“ICE”).34 Because
denying ICE patents to automotive manufacturers does not prevent the
manufacturers from creating or selling ICE cars and trucks,35 the ratio
27

Id.
Tom Voelk, Europe and the U.S. Share a Lot, Except When It Comes to Cars: Why you
will not see the new Seat Leon or the Skoda Octavia in Kansas driveways, nor many big
S.U.V.s in French ones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03
/04/automobiles/european-us-cars-automakers.html [https://perma.cc/PXY8-5XU4].
29
Thomas Franklin & Kate Gaudry, Patent Trends Study Part Five: Automotive Industry,
IP WATCHDOG (May 7, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/05/07/patent-trends-study
-part-five-automotive/id=108960/ [https://perma.cc/JXK4-8LCQ].
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.; but see Steven Mufson, General Motors to Eliminate Gasoline and Diesel Light Duty
Cars and SUVs by 2035, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/cli
mate-environment/2021/01/28/general-motors-electric/ [https://perma.cc/86D9-KVDV]
(showing a historic turning point for American carmakers).
33
Id.
34
While GM made strong promises to move entirely away from the internal combustion
engine by 2035, Sierra Club’s Jim Motavalli is skeptical. See Jim Motavalli, Can GM Keep
Its Promise to Abandon the Internal Combustion Engine?, SIERRA CLUB (Feb. 15, 2021),
https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/can-gm-keep-its-promise-abandon-internal-combustion
-engine [https://perma.cc/8CD6-AS4R].
35
See Carolyn Abbot & David Booton, Using Patent Law’s Teaching Function to Introduce
an Environmental Ethic into the Process of Technical Innovation, 21 GEO. INT’L ENV’T L.
REV. 219, 227–28 (2009).
28

2022]

ENCOURAGING SUSTAINABLE INNOVATION

905

of ICE and sustainable automotive patents cannot be used as a direct
indication of what is being made and sold by manufactures. However, the
ratio of ICE patents as compared to Electric Vehicle patents does measure where companies are investing their time and money and can possibly be extrapolated to predict the future of the industry. The method of
using patent trends to show the future of an industry is underdeveloped.
While there is little literature on the topic, patents arising out of companies demonstrate where the companies are allocating research and development resources.36 Then, with an average patenting cost of ten
thousand dollars,37 it is acceptable to presume that a company pursuing
a patent saw at least some potential in the innovation. Consequently,
despite the vows of some American automotive manufacturers, patent
filings would indicate that the future of American automotive manufacturing still appears to remain in the hands of combustion engines.
It is not feasible, nor is it appropriate, to categorically ban ICE
patents. Many ICE patent applications may be furthering the efficiency
of combustion engines.38 However, a carefully crafted post-grant environmental challenge process could weigh incentives in favor of environmentally neutral innovation. This industrial greening will then rattle down
the chain to the consumer of the products and reduce personal pollution.
The American patent system should only reward true innovation, and
sustainability must become part of that definition.
II.

PATENTS FOSTERING INNOVATION

The patent system is intended to, and has proven successful at,
encouraging innovation by granting to inventors exclusive rights for a
limited time in exchange for public disclosure of their innovation.39 The
36

It is assumed that patents are used to recoup research costs, and, therefore, outline
research bearing fruit. However, there are other ways to fund research that may diminish
the ability to track research through patents, such as public funding. See Nuno Pires de
Carvalho, The Primary Function of Patents, 2001 U.ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 25, 50–51 (2001).
37
Figure based on IPWatchdog’s calculation of a minimally complex patent. See Gene
Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015), https://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485/
[https://perma.cc/Z67E-ZFM9].
38
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 2016/0230696 A1 (granted Oct. 10, 2018) (Ford patent for a
hybrid composite cylinder head aimed at increasing efficiency).
39
The USPTO granted 354,430 patents in 2019, more than any previous year. U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART, https://www.uspto.gov/web
/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm [https://perma.cc/59JM-2LEB] (last modified Jan. 29,
2022, 11:05 AM).
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bundle of rights bestowed by an American patent grant include the right
to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling a protected invention in the United States.40 Therefore, assuming a patent
describes an invention desired by the market, inventors may recoup their
research and development costs, and often much more.41 In exchange for
the exclusive rights granted by a patent, the inventor publicly discloses
the function and form of the invention to effectively progress the field
and inform the public of the advancement.42 At the end of the patent
term, the published invention will enter the public domain and be competitively produced.43
The power in a patent grant is not in giving a patent holder the
right to make, use, or sell an invention, but in allowing them to prevent
others from doing so.44 Therefore, the patent system does not have the
power to directly stop the production of products that degrade the environment,45 but it does have the power to indirectly stop the emergence of
environmentally negligent innovation by refusing to grant exclusive rights
to inventors. An environmental challenge to patent grants encourages the
implementation and consideration of sustainable practices within innovation without directly banning dirty innovation. An environmental challenge encourages industry leaders to invest their time and research in
desirable sustainable products, or face market-share battles with competitors that reverse-engineer the most profitable products.46 A powerful
patent can give a company a foothold within an industry, and the absence
of patent protection can shape the very nature of an industry within the
global market.47

40

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
Pires de Carvalho, supra note 36, at 50–51.
42
35 U.S.C. § 154.
43
See id.
44
Patent grants do not guarantee that the holder can make and sell their innovation,
they must still comply with all of the other applicable laws and regulations governing
their industry. However, it does allow them to stop others from utilizing or selling their
innovation. See id.
45
Abbot & Booton, supra note 35, at 227–28.
46
See James Pooley, The Art of Reverse Engineering, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 4, 2017), https://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/12/04/art-reverse-engineering/id=90439/#:~:text=You
%20can’t%20use%20the,and%20duplicate%20a%20patented%20invention.&text=Finally
%2C%20you%20can’t%20through,be%20confused%20about%20its%20source
[https://perma.cc/TZ3X-GCRJ].
47
See generally Suma Athreye et al., Small Firms and Patenting Revisited, SMALL BUS.
ECON. (2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-020-00323-1 [https://perma.cc/S7TX-5DB8].
41
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Pharmaceuticals in India: The Power of Patent Laws

Not all industries are equally affected by changes in patent law.48
Industries that require a large research and development investment
(e.g., pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and the automotive industry)49
rely heavily on patents to recuperate their costs before competitors enter
the field, while the food industry traditionally does not rely on exclusive
rights to the same degree.50
India’s treatment of pharmaceutical patents demonstrates how
patent rights can mold industry.51 Beginning in 1972, India built a generic
drug empire by refusing to give patent protection to pharmaceuticals.52
Without Indian protection to pharmaceutical patents, companies had no
standing to find infringement against manufactures making and selling
generic drugs within Indian borders.53 The pharmaceutical industries
frustration towards India’s refusal to grant pharmaceutical patents was
one of the catalysts of the Trade-Related Aspects of International Property
(“TRIPS”) agreement.54 While today, India, as a World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) member, is required to offer patent protection to pharmaceuticals
under the TRIPS agreement,55 India continues to find space within TRIPS’s
language to marginalize the protection it gives the pharmaceutical industry.56 Without consistent patent protection, the generic pharmaceutical
48

See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1581–82 (2003).
49
See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., Industry, Technology, and the Global Marketplace, in SCIENCE
AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 6-1 (2014), https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind14/index
.cfm/chapter-6/c6s4.htm [https://perma.cc/E3VW-LH98] (stating that in 2012, the majority
of HT patents were in the field of semiconductors).
50
See NAT’L SCI. FOUND., THREE-QUARTERS OF U.S. BUSINESSES THAT PERFORMED OR FUNDED
R&D VIEWED TRADE SECRETS AS IMPORTANT IN 2018 (Sept. 2, 2021), https://ncses.nsf.gov
/pubs/nsf21339 [https://perma.cc/Q2UK-44M4] (demonstrating that many industries, like
the food and beverage industries, rely on other IP mechanisms like trade secrets that
allow them to keep their recipes secret indefinitely).
51
See generally Mueller, supra note 6.
52
Id. at 495.
53
See, e.g., Gardiner Harris & Katie Thomas, Low-Cost in Poor Nations Get a Lift in Indian
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/global/top
-court-in-india-rejects-novartis-drug-patent.html [https://perma.cc/TR5M-8NLQ] (covering
the Indian court holding that Novartis cannot stop drug manufactures in India from
manufacturing and selling Gleevec).
54
See Lawrence Gostin et al., How the US Elevates Corporate Interests Over Global Public
Health. And How the World Can Respond, HEALTHAFFAIRS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www
.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180830.186562/full/ [https://perma.cc/TE8S-K82H].
55
Mueller, supra note 6, at 495.
56
Id. at 495–96.
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industry in India continues to dominate the market and tamper drug
prices.57 As a result, large pharmaceutical companies innovating within the
industry stay out of India.58 American pharmaceuticals adamantly argue
that if every country followed this model, it would no longer be profitable
for pharmaceutical companies to spend on Research and Development.59
The pharmaceutical industry in India demonstrates that the implementation of patent laws can foster dramatic growth in one area of
industry (generic drugs) while keeping another at bay (large pharmaceutical name brands). For example, keeping with the theme of pharmaceuticals,
under a post-grant environmental challenge a third party could potentially
prove that byproducts from a pharmaceutical company’s process patents
that produce an active ingredient in a blockbuster drug endanger the
health and safety of humans and prejudice the environment.60 With the
threat of third parties invalidating the patent, pharmaceutical companies
would be forced to consider environmental repercussions of their process
and utility patents to ensure that the claims do not cause serious environmental harm when practiced on a large scale. While there are other
remedies for such harms in other areas of law, most address the harm after
it has occurred.61 The financial risk of losing even one year of an important patent’s term could force industry to consider the environment early
in their innovative process, before they begin causing harm.

57

MCKINSEY & CO., INDIA PHARMA 2020: PROPELLING ACCESS AND ACCEPTANCE, REALIZING
TRUE POTENTIAL 13 (2020), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client
_service/Pharma%20and%20Medical%20Products/PMP%20NEW/PDFs/778886_India
_Pharma_2020_Propelling_Access_and_Acceptance_Realising_True_Potential.ashx
[https://perma.cc/ZF7Z-KZVG].
58
See id. (showing that seventy to eighty percent of the drug market is dominated by
generic drug makers rather than innovators).
59
The Congressional Research Service’s detailed report showed the importance of
patenting to recoup pharmaceutical costs and how pharmaceutical companies are abusing
the system to extend the term of their patents beyond what was envisioned. See generally
CONG. RSCH. SERV., DRUG PRICING & PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTING PRACTICES (Feb. 11,
2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46221.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQM9-9DHA].
60
See generally N. Adler et al., Environmental Impact Assessment and Control of Pharmaceuticals: The Role of Environmental Agencies, 57 WATER SCI. TECH. 91 (2008) (highlighting the environmental risks that pharmaceuticals create and the difficulties in
regulating the industry).
61
See, e.g., Nathaniel Rich, The Lawyer Who Became DuPont’s Worst Nightmare, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/magazine/the-lawyer-who-be
came-duponts-worst-nightmare.html [https://perma.cc/M6DB-GJ56] (highlighting the
vast discovery and scientific research that went into Rob Bilott’s legendary battle with
DuPont which recently was turned into a motion picture).
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MAKING ROOM FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE

Post-grant review (“PGR”) and inter partes review (“IPR”) were
crafted as speedy, relatively inexpensive, and more specialized alternatives to challenging a patent’s validity in a district court proceeding.62
But, an environmental challenge is far outside the scope of the current IPR
and PGR regimes. Therefore, it makes more sense to create a new avenue
for third parties to challenge the validity of a patent instead of attempting to mutilate IPR or PGR to fit the needs of a successful environmental
challenge. This Section explains how PGR and IPR have created a useful
infrastructure within the USPTO that could be tapped to incorporate a
successful environmental challenge. This Section then explains how the
environmental challenge must differ from the PGR and IPR regimes, while
substantially borrowing from both, to create progressive change within
American patent law.
The 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) radically
changed the American patent system and proved that large scale restructuring of our patent system is feasible and periodically necessary.63 The
biggest change introduced by the AIA was the transition from a first-toinvent priority granting scheme to the more common internationally used
first-to-file system.64 Changes in the issuance of priority for patent registration naturally called for changes in a third parties’ ability to challenge
the validity, and specifically priority, of an application.65 IPR accompanied the enactment of the first-to-file priority as a counterpart to PGR.66
Together, IPR and PGR repealed the obsolete inter partes re-examination
and have become widely utilized paths for third parties to challenge the
validity of patent applications.67
A.

Timing

Indicated by their designation as post-grant challenges, both IPR
and PGR challenges take place after the issuance of a patent.68 This timing
62

See Ryan Kenny, Which Invalidity Avenue to Take: Inter Partes Review Verses Post-Grant
Review, IPWATCHDOG (July 31, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/31/which-in
validity -avenue-ipr-verses-post-grant-review/id=99460/ [https://perma.cc/66VC-B9D5].
63
The act restructured USPTO at its core—its filing system. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
64
Anything after March 16, 2013, is first-to-file. See id.
65
Christa Laser, The Scope of IPR Estoppel: A Statutory, Historical, and Normative Analysis,
70 FLA. L. REV. 1127, 1129–31 (2018).
66
Kenny, supra note 62.
67
IPR is only available after PGR’s statutory period has run. Id.
68
See id.
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is possibly the most important and defining aspect that an environmental challenge must echo. Briefly looking at the nearly extinct doctrine of
moral utility will demonstrate why a third-party environmental challenge
is preferential to an environmental standard applied by the USPTO
during the application review proceedings.69
Throughout the history of the American patent system, legal scholars have considered refusing patent grants to inventions that do not have
a “moral utility.”70 Moral utility arose out of Justice Story’s Lowell v. Lewis
opinion in 1817, and continued to narrow the scope of patentable innovation for decades.71 Early American jurisprudence allowed the USPTO to
refuse patents for inventions that they deemed “morally controversial.”72
During this time, inventions such as “gambling machines and fraudulent
articles” were deemed unworthy of exclusionary rights.73 However, by the
early twentieth century, courts began narrowing the moral utility doctrine until an invention’s moral utility could be satisfied if it merely had
at least one moral purpose.74 Today, the courts are very unlikely to uphold
a refusal on the grounds of moral utility.75 The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit held in Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang that invalidating patents because one can use the item for deceptive or illegal purposes is no
longer good law.76 While the USPTO does still claim to consider the moral
utility of patents, the grounds for refusal are rarely, if ever, used.77
Other patent systems have been equally reluctant to use environmental harm to strike down patent applications.78 In Europe, the European
Patent Office (“EPO”) has interpreted Article 53(a) of the European Patent
Convention (“EPC”) as restricting the grant of a patent to inventions the
commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or
morality.79 The EPO’s Technical Board of Appeals has enumerated that

69

See generally Julien Crockett, Morality: An Important Consideration at the Patent Office,
108 CAL. 267 (2020) (presenting an adept history of moral utility in American patent law).
70
See Abbot & Booton, supra note 35, at 225–27.
71
Id. at 227, n.34.
72
Id. at 225–27.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
See, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding
that a juice machine has utility even though it deceives the customers into thinking it
dispenses out of a holding tank rather than mixing from concentrate).
76
Id.
77
See Abbot & Booton, supra note 35, at 227.
78
Id. at 225–27.
79
Id. at 225 (citing Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent
Convention) art. 53(a), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254 (amended in 2000).
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protection of the environment, and consequently inventions that, if exploited, would likely seriously prejudice the environment, were to be
excluded from patenting by the doctrine of ordre public.80 This sentiment
is additionally reflected in the Agreement on TRIPS, to which both European nations and the United States belong.81 However, Article 53(a) has
proven ineffective in protecting environmental interests in a variety of
suits.82 First, in T19/90 Harvard/Onco-Mouse, the EPO determined that
Article 53(a) of the EPC’s barring ability did not simply hinge on whether
the exploited contents of an application prejudiced the environment, but
actually was only applicable if the possible risks to the environment
outweighed the invention’s usefulness to mankind.83 The way this balancing test is implemented makes it entirely unlikely that Article 53(a)
will ever bar the grant of a patent under environmental considerations.84
In T356/93 Plant Cells/Plant Genetic Systems, the Technical Board elaborated that the balancing exercise is especially important in situations
where environmental prejudice existed, but was just one way of assessing
the patentability of the invention.85 The Board added that the revocation
of the patent on the grounds that it caused environmental prejudice
required that the threat to the environment be sufficiently substantiated
at the time the decision to revoke the patent was made.86 Therefore, not
only does the EPO have to prove that there is no way to utilize the patent
without causing substantial prejudice to the environment, but they must
do so at the time of the denial.87 The difficulty of proving harm during the
application period is an almost insurmountable obstacle—an obstacle
shared by the doctrine of moral utility in the United States.
Justice Story found moral utility’s origin in Section 101 of the
Patent Act.88 Section 101 requires that a patent promote the progress of
“useful” arts.89 But the issue with “dirty” innovation is not that it is no
longer useful. The utility of “dirty” innovation elevated the United States
80

Id.
TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art.
27(2), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
82
See, e.g., T19/90 Harvard/Onco-Mouse, [1990] E.P.O.R., 20–21.
83
Id.
84
See Abbot & Booton, supra note 35, at 225–27.
85
T356/93 Plant Cells/Plant Genetic Systems, [1995] E.P.O.R. 1, 17–32.
86
Id.
87
See id.
88
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1018–19 (Cir. Ct. 1817).
89
35 U.S.C. § 101.
81
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onto the world stage following the Second World War, however, scientist
have proven that this utility has been matched by environmental harm
that created the climate change crisis.90 Therefore, while the patent system
may not be well suited to prevent any innovation that may be harmful
during the application process, it may be able to minimize the value of
the grants whose industrialization causes environmental prejudice and
force industry to reconsider where they invest their resources. Moral utility,
and any other grounds for denying patents because of their use, are illsuited to challenge the validity of a patent during the initial proceedings
because it is unclear, and potentially unfair, to determine how an applicant will use a patent grant before the invention has entered the public
sphere.91 However, implementing an environmental challenge administered by the Patent and Trademark Appeals Board (“PTAB”) may enable
the patent system to encourage sustainable thinking during the innovation process. The risk of losing even one year on the term of a successful
patent may be enough to encourage new levels of sustainable thinking.92
B.

Scope

PGR and IPR serve slightly different purposes.93 While they both
contain similar structures, the pair balance each other and serve as avenues for specific challenges to the validity of a patent.94 Even though it
does not make sense to force an environmental challenge into PGR or IPR,
an environmental challenge could exist as an additional prong of the postgrant challenges available to third parties.
Both IPRs and PGRs challenge the validity of a patent before the
PTAB, the successor of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.95
The PTAB primarily contains judges with strong expertise in patent law
and technology.96 PTAB judges’ technical expertise make them especially

90

Steep increase in emissions after the industrial revolution. See EPA, supra note 8.
See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–68 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
92
See generally Neel U. Sukhatme & Judd N.L. Cramer, Who Cares About Patent Term?
Cross-Industry Differences in Term Sensitivity, 2 Princeton Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working
Paper, 2014 (demonstrating that some industries, like pharmaceuticals, are particularly
sensitive to patent term).
93
See Kenny, supra note 62.
94
See id.
95
Id.
96
Janett Gongola, The Patent Trial and Appeal Board: Who are they and what do they do?,
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. (June 6, 2019, 8:08 AM), https://www.uspto.gov/learning
91
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well-suited to untangle the technological intricacies and to digest the
scientific arguments expected in an environmental challenge.97
The standards to bring a PGR and IPR differ primarily because of
the scope of the challenges.98 In IPR, a petitioner must establish “a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at
least [one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”99 This standard is
fairly low because IPR challenges are confined to claims that the patent
is invalid on the basis of prior art patents or printed publications under
Sections 102 and 103 of Title 35.100 With such a narrow scope, IPRs have
relatively low discovery costs, and, therefore, in the eyes of PTAB, only
require a low burden to be heard. The standard for granting a PGR is
higher than the standard for an IPR.101 In a PGR challenge, the petitioner
must establish “that it is more likely than not that at least [one] of the
claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”102 The heightened
standard, along with PGR’s requirement that it be brought within a ninemonth window after the issuance of a patent, counteract PGR’s vast
grounds for challenging a patent.103
The scope of an environmental challenge would likely be vast.
Especially because an environmental challenge should be available for
the life of a patent, the standard for granting the review would need to be
even more stringent than PGR. Exactly how stringent the proposed standard should be is a conversation that this Note leaves to others, however.
Following the trajectory of IPR and PGR’s standards, it should be reasonably burdensome on the suing party to discourage frivolous actions.
Another safeguard against frivolous petitions is the finality of a
PTAB decision to accept or to deny a party’s challenge.104 Once PTAB denies a petition, the petitioner will be barred from asserting additional
arguments or information that could have reasonably been incorporated
into the first petition.105 In the context of an environmental challenge,
this could preclude multiple challenges from a competitor. While the
-and-resources/newsletter/inventors-eye/patent-trial-and-appeal-board-who-are-they-and
-what [https://perma.cc/GQ7C-K2QK].
97
See id.
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See Kenny, supra note 62.
99
35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
100
See Kenny, supra note 62.
101
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102
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See id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
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public may be eager to strike at industry with invalidating suits, they
must wait until their case is strong enough to warrant risking their sole
chance of invalidation.
C.

Discovery

Discovery is also more expansive, and, therefore, more expensive
in PGR than IPR because the available claims cover a much wider scope.106
However, discovery in both PGR and IPR are less expensive than traditional patent litigation in district courts.107 IPR has “three stages of discovery: mandatory initial disclosures, routine disclosures, and additional
discovery.”108 Routine discovery encompasses expert depositions and is
often the only stage used because mandatory initial disclosures require
agreement between parties, and PTAB rarely determines that additional
discovery is necessary in the “interest of justice.”109 Since discovery often
acts as a great equalizer between parties in a dispute, this strict discovery procedure puts the petitioner at a disadvantage.110 Consequently, the
petitioner is likely to have a strong, well-developed case before filling an
IPR.111 PGR has a more extensive discovery that allows accesses to relevant evidence that is “directly related to . . . factual assertions advanced
by either party.”112 Furthermore, additional discovery is granted significantly more often because the threshold to grant is “good cause,” a lower
bar than in the “interest of justice.”113 This makes PGR a more expensive
avenue than IPR, but still cheaper than a district court proceeding.
Environmental suits traditionally require extensive discovery and
thorough scientific studies.114 To have a successful environmental challenge, the petitioner’s burden would be proving actual, significant environmental harm. While this harm is something that should be in hand
before the petition is filed with PTAB; the data, research, and capital often
reside with the defending party. Therefore, an environmental challenge
would require reasonably vast discovery to act as the great equalizer between industry and environmental interest groups.
106

See Kenny, supra note 62.
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108
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AUTHORITY

Briefly, this Part discusses the constitutional authority to revoke
a patent grant because it unduly prejudices the environment. Beyond
constitutional authority, this Part also shows how an environmental
challenge would not violate the United States’ international obligations,
namely the TRIPS agreement.
Scholars disagree as to the origins of the American patent system.
While some point to the British crown, others trace it back further to
Venetian law.115 Regardless, Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution
specifically enumerates that “Congress shall have Power To . . . promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”116 Section 101 of the Patent Act sets a low bar for patent
eligible subject matter.117 The Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty is commonly cited as stating that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by
man.’”118 However, this does not suggest that there are no limits to what
patent law embraces as patentable.119 U.S. Code Section 2181 specifically
denied and revoked all patents for “any invention or discovery which is
useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy
in an atomic weapon.”120 While atomic weapons are far from an internal
combustion engine, this demonstrates that the harm that some innovation
has the potential to cause is significant enough to bar the grant of exclusive patent rights. The potential harm of nuclear weapons is immediate
and devastating in a single implementation, while the harm from industries reluctance to address climate change has been gradual and cumulative.121 Again, this is why any environmental challenge would need to
take place post-grant.
The United States also has additional international obligations
to address when making changes to patent laws. In particular, Article
115

Stefania Fusco, Lessons from the Past: The Venetian Republic’s Tailoring of Patent
Protection, 17 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 301, 312–14 (2020).
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117
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See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 656–57 (2010) (invalidating a business method
patent as non-patentable subject matter).
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See Andrew Nickischer, Environmental Impacts of Internal Combustion Engines and
Electric Battery Vehicles, 4 DUQ. UNIV. QUARK 21, 23 (2020).
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27(1) of TRIPS requires that “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether product or process, in all fields of technology, provided that
they are new, involve and inventive step and are capable of industrial
application.”122 Additionally, this clause, also known as the non-discrimination clause of Article 27, dictates that all industries be treated similarly.
Therefore, some may argue that an environmental challenge in the American patent system discriminates against certain industries, namely those
who traditionally have large environmental impacts. However, the parties
at the Uruguay Round specifically considered environmental harm as a
concern that future patent systems may address. TRIPS 27(2) specifies
that members of TRIPS “may exclude from patentability inventions, the
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which
is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect
human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment . . . .”123 An issue with this language has been proving that the
prevention of the invention’s commercial exploitation would prevent harm.
Here, the design of the environmental challenge addresses this issue.
Patent laws targeting the use of an invention after grant have met
opposition within both American and international legal authority. However, the form and function of a post-grant environmental challenge may
be able to overcome these obstacles by addressing the real harm caused
by patented inventions, rather than potential harm. Consequently, a carefully constructed environmental challenge is feasible on a national and
international level.
V.

CRITICS

Carolyn Abbot and David Booton argue for the introduction of an
environmental disclosure into the patent system in order to force industry
to evaluate the environmental impact of their proposed creation and disclose the evaluation to the world.124 While the author of this Note believes
that this is a brilliant use of the patent system’s teaching function, the
patent system may have even more potential to combat climate change.
Abbot and Booton shy away from an environmental challenge because “the
potential risks in relation to the exploitation of a given invention cannot
be anticipated merely on the basis of the disclosure of the invention in a
122

See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, at art. 27(1).
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 81, at art. 27(2).
124
See generally Abbot & Booton, supra note 35 (proposing an environmental impact
disclosure requirement for the grant of a potential patent).
123
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patent specification.”125 Additionally, Abbot and Booton argue that “patent
granting authorities are poorly qualified to judge questions of morality . .. [and] environmental harm,” and that such a bar may “[vest] the
patent office with an inappropriate legislative power” that belongs to
other authorities.126
Abbot and Booton’s concerns that potential risks are prohibitively
difficult to prove in a consistently fair system is valid if done during the
patent application process. However, the post-grant nature of the environmental challenge discussed in this Note predominately overcomes this
obstacle. Furthermore, the author of this Note disagrees that the technical
PTAB Court has poor qualifications to judge the scientifically intimate
question of environmental harm. Arguably, PTAB is the most technical
Court in the country, making it well-equipped to digest and adjudicate
environmental issues.127
CONCLUSION
In an ideal world, American industry, and the United States
generally, would have led a united response against climate change when
presented with undisputable evidence. But, change is hard, and people
can be stubborn when filled with fear in the face of disaster. This Note
discusses the possibility that the American patent system could play a
larger role in fighting climate change. But, the disruption such a change
would bring to the patent system is severe and warrants further discussion because a worst-case climate induced upheaval of the economy could
render the patent system all but irrelevant.

125

Id. at 228.
Id. at 228–31.
127
See Gongola, supra note 96.
126

